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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION 
by Earl A. Pope 
Dr. Earl A. Pope (Presbyterian) is professor emeritus of religious studies at Lafayette 
College, Easton, Pennsylvania. He is on the Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE 
and has previously written articles in this periodical. This paper was prepared for an 
international conference on "The Role of Religion in Newly Pluralistic Societies in 
Eastern Europe" which was held in Budapest, May 22-26, 1991. Professor Pope is 
preparing an update on the religious situation in Romania based in large measure on 
his encounters with the religious communities during the summer of 199 1 as a guest 
of Fundatiei Culturale Romane. 
Before the revolution there were fourteen officially approved religious communities in 
the Socialist Republic of Romania regulated by the 1948 Law of Cults; the Roman Catholic 
Church had de facto recognition on the basis of a license, but it did not have its own statute 
because of a number of unresolved problems.1 
The Romanian Orthodox Church, obviously the most prominent of the sanctioned bodies, 
has claimed the allegiance of approximately seventy percent of the population of the country 
or sixteen million followers. This Church has been well organized and effectively 
administered with a highly trained clergy (a core of whom have studied in the West), 
distinguished theological scholars, an abundance of candidates for the priesthood, extensive 
ecumenical relationships, and some of the finest journals within the Orthodox world. 
Presumably it had no special privileges within the Romanian Socialist State; in practice, 
however, its position amounted virtually to an establishment vis-a-vis the other religious 
communities. 2 The Orthodox Church was closely monitored by the State which was 
extremely sensitive to any evidence of internal dissent within this community. No member 
of the hierarchy of the Church was officially recognized without careful consultation with 
the State officials and without their prior approval. There was unquestionably restiveness 
within the Church regarding the modus vivendi with the State, but there was an obvious 
absence of the creative leadership (certainly on the part of the State as well as on the part of 
the Church), which was deemed necessary to bring about a far more constructive 
relationship. 
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The Latin Rite Catholic Church has had its stronghold in Transylvania and has claimed 
more than 1,000 churches. It is considered to have about 1,300,000 members, the majority 
of whom are Hungarians, but it also has strong German and Romanian constituencies. The 
relationships between the Roman Catholic Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church have 
been among the most complex and difficult in the millennial-old controversy between 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy; this has been due in large measure to the controversy related to 
the Romanian Uniate Church, whose union with Rome dated back to 1700 and profoundly 
divided the Transylvanian Romanian community. The Romanian Orthodox Church had 
tenaciously held the position that the "reintegration" of the Uniates into the Orthodox Church 
in 1948 was an historic moment of the profoundest significance and constituted the 
reparation of an ancient injustice.3 The Catholic Church has maintained, however, that the 
whole "reunion" was brought about by sheer political power and that most of the Uniate 
clergy and many of the faithful were in radical opposition to it.'4, Frequent discussions had 
taken place between the Communist authorities and representatives of the Vatican in an 
effort to improve the situation of the Catholic Church and to resolve the Uniate crisis. It 
appears that Vatican officials had previously given up any hope regarding the resurrection 
of this Church. 
The Protestant communities constitute a very lively and formidable bloc of churches 
which have added their own unique challenge and tensions to the Romanian nation. They 
may be viewed in two major categories: (I) the traditional or historic churches (Lutheran, 
Reformed, Unitarian) emerging out of the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation and 
largely concentrated in Transylvania and (2) the so-called Neo-Protestant bodies6 (Adventist, 
Baptist, Christians According to the Gospel--also called the Brethren, and Pentecostal) 
entering Transylvania and the Old Kingdom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
Lutheran and the Reformed Churches represented the right wing of the Reformation and 
quickly became identified with the German and the Hungarian communities. The Unitarians 
were at one point regarded as heretics particularly because of their anti-trinitarianism. They 
still maintain serious doctrinal differences with the Lutherans and the Reformed although 
they have cooperated closely with them and in many ways may be identified with them in 
their cultural concerns. The Unitarian views found a deep response within the Szekler 
community, now regarded as a subgroup of the Hungarian people. Over the course of the 
centuries, the preservation of the cultural heritage has become a primary responsibility of 
these religious traditions. The Reformed faith is still regarded as a unique vessel for the 
preservation and transmission of "Magyar religion" in Transylvania.6 The Lutheran Church 
of the Transylvanian Saxons has perceived itself as the bearer of German culture. Attempts 
were once made to establish ethnic Romanian Lutheran and Reformed churches but with 
little success. 
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Two other Orthodox communities in Romania are related to ethnic minorities: the 
Armenian-Gregorians, connected with the Oriental Orthodox, and the Christians of the _Old 
Rite (popularly called Lipovenians), descendants of the Old Believers schism in Russia: The 
Jewish community, with a long history that goes back to the Roman era, was radically 
decimated first by the Holocaust and then by massive emigrations to Israel, but the remnant 
(approximately 20,000) had reported a relatively active and free Jewish life before the 
revolution. There had been reports of antisemitic references, however, in officially 
sanctioned publications. The Muslim community, mostly to be found along the Black Sea 
coast, goes back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the Turkish armies invaded 
the country. It has about 50,000 members in ninety religious communities with its center in 
Constantsa. These religious communities are relatively small and assumed a very low profile 
under the Communist regime vis-a-vis the other churches. 
The Neo-Protestant churches in a sense are the left-wing descendants of the Protestant 
Reformation with less emphasis placed on the institution of the Church, its creeds, a 
professional ministry, or the sacraments and more on a Biblical orientation, personal religious 
experience, ethical living, lay leadership, a supportive community, an eschatological thrust, 
and a powerful awareness of mission. Related to them are a number of unofficial religious 
bodies, such as the Reformed Adventists, the Nazarenes, the Pentecostal "Dissidents," and the 
Army of the Lord, which began as evangelically oriented lay movement within the Orthodox 
Church. The Neo-Protestant churches have had a phenomenal growth since 1 948, 
particularly among the ethnic Romanians, much to the dismay of the Romanian Orthodox 
leaders. Their constituency was considered to be approximately one million at the end of 
1 990. 
Prior to a direct focus on the Romanian revolution and the churches, it is important to 
explore in part some of the dimensions of the Transylvanian crisis which helped precipitate 
the uprising. This crisis has deep and complex historical roots, regarding which, objectivity 
is very difficult to discover. The union of Transylvania with Romania following World War 
I unquestionably represented the culmination of long-cherished Romanian hopes and dreams, 
but this union and its implications have continued to remain a focal point of serious 
controversy between the Hungarian and the Romanian peoples up to the present time. The 
central problem with the history of Transylvania is simply that there are radically different 
Romanian and Hungarian versions, both strongly expressed and neither acceptable to the 
other. The thesis has been suggested that a mythicized concept of Transylvania which may 
have little to do with existing realities plays a central role in the national consciousness of 
both nations, especially since Transylvania is seen as having ensured the survival of the 
nation in the most critical stage of its development. 7 
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The year 1948 was a critical one for all the Romanian churches. A Communist 
government with its Marxist-Leninist ideology was then in full control and a new Law of 
Religious Cults carefully delineated the relationships between Church and State.8 This law 
spelled out what were considered to be the constitutional rights of freedom of conscience and 
religious freedom under the Communist regime, and it established a comprehensive--and at 
times ruthless--system of State control over all tb.e religious communities. The churches were 
under the direct jurisdiction of what was called the Department of Cults, a very important 
agency run by a nationwide network of highly skilled personnel. This agency had impressive 
resources at its command whereby it could be certain that the religious legislation and a 
variety of even more stringent oral interpretations, which often blatantly subverted the 
constitutional freedom of believers and their communities, were carefully followed.9 Indeed 
it has been considered little more than an agency of the dreaded Securitate or secret police. 
In recent years there were incontrovertible reports of a growing crisis brought about by 
a constellation of pressures on the Hungarian religious institutions as well as those of other 
communities in Romania. As the economic situation deteriorated rapidly in Romania after 
1980, the Hungarian community could envision only a very bleak future. Consequently, 
there was increasing despair about attempts at internal reform, leading to a series of appeals 
and protests to the West, especially to Hungary, which stirred up paranoias of irredentism 
among the Romanian leaders.10 The response of the Romanian State to the profound 
restiveness was with even more repressive measures. The result simply was that the 
Hungarians came to perceive the internal pressures as having reached intolerable levels.11 
The traditional policy of the Hungarian Communist State and the religious leaders, with 
difficulties in the neighboring Socialist country, was that of public silence with the emphasis 
on the exercise of quiet low-profile diplomacy. It was inevitable that there would be a 
radical change in this approach. This conspiracy of silence in Hungary was finally broken 
in the summer of 1 986. An unofficial ecumenical group comprised of members of the major 
religious communities issued "A Call for Reconciliation to the Caring People of Hungary and 
Romania."12 It is of some signific�nce that the Hungarian State would permit the churches 
to be the first to openly address this sensitive issue. The ecumenical group urged the Pope, 
the World Council of Churches, the Soviet Union, and Western human rights activists to work 
together to encourage the Romanian authorities to end their repressive policies against 
Transylvania's national and religious minorities. References were made to the use of police 
terror, to the extensive informant system, to the brutal beatings, to torture, and even to those 
who had become martyrs. The Romanians themselves were terrorized as well as their 
Hungarian neighbors. 
While there was relaxation in other Socialist countries, life became even more brutalized 
in Romania. The ecumenical committee charged that Hungarian culture was being subverted 
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systematically at every level of the society. The conviction was enunciated that the churches 
of Romania could play an important role in bringing about reconciliation. The ecumenical 
group admitted, however, that in the past the churches had often been manipulated "for the 
fermentation of extreme nationalism and racial hatred." The "Call for Reconciliation" 
included the vision of Transylvania as a "scene of Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Reformed, 
Lutheran, and Baptist brotherhood." The inclusion of the Baptists here is of great interest 
in that this indicates the important role that they had begun to play within the Romanian 
context. 
Paradoxically, the focus on Transylvania as such may help to explain some of the 
emotional nuances of the responses by the Romanian leaders. This vision of a Transylvanian 
way of life, which in a sense would be a fusion of all three main national cultures, was 
perceived as a dangerous concept in that it questioned the unity and integrity of the 
Romanian nation.13 The perceived echoes of Transylvanianism, with all of its implications, 
could only stir up additional dimensions of paranoia among an already confused and insecure 
Romanian leadership. The "Call" set into motion a veritable avalanche of appeals and 
protests, not only from the Hungarian churches followed by the State, but also from churches 
and international agencies around the world. The response from the Romanian State and 
religious leaders was that the picture presented was totally false, both constitutionally and 
in reality, and was prompted by sinister, self-serving motivations. The Romanian Orthodox 
leadership responded unequivocally that internal ecumenism in every way was "a living and 
indisputable reality."14 The Reformed bishops were appalled that such charges could be 
made.15 The growing controversy brought about a public confrontation between two of the 
foremost ecumenicaUeaders in Eastern Europe who were also the primary religious leaders 
in their respective countries. Orthodox Metropolitan Antonie of Transylvania unequivocally 
denied the reports of religious and cultural discrimination against the Hungarian minority ,16 
and Dr. Karoly Toth, bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary, took serious issue with 
Metropolitan Antonie. He claimed that he had no desire to reopen the wounds of the past 
but that he did consider "one-sided and tendentious information to be dangerous because it 
makes reconciliation impossible."17 
The flight of thousands of refugees across the border into Hungary beginning in the 
summer of 1987, and escalating dramatically at the beginning of 1988, immeasurably 
compounded the tensions both within Romania and between Romania and Hungary. The 
refugees were primarily ethnic Hungarians, but there was an increasing number of ethnic 
Romanians. The seriousness with. which the problems in Transylvania were perceived, 
concurrent with the radical erosion of the credibility of the religious leaders in Romania, was 
demonstrated by the public intervention of one of the major religious bodies, the World 
Alliance of Reformed Churches. The strategy of this ecumenical body in the past had also 
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been the policy of quiet diplomacy, but now a public intervention appeared to be imperative. 
The tensions raised by the flood of refugees into Hungary with their tragic reports coupled 
with the plans announced by the Romanian State in the spring of 1988 to further its program 
of systematization of its agricultural land by destroying approximately half of its villages, 
many of them in Transylvania, and moving the people into new "urban agro-industrial 
centers" needed to be addressed.18 The World Alliance sent a public protest directly to 
Ceausescu and charged that systematization Ceausescu style could "only tear apart the fabric 
of society, violate human and civil rights, and deprive thousands of their traditions, cultural 
heritage, and language." It called upon the Romanian government to "respect the 
fundamental rights of all its citizens and, therefore, to rescind its decision to implement this 
destructive program."19 It also informed all its member churches regarding its action and 
requested that they indicate their support by writing or cabling Ceausescu.20 A worldwide 
response occurred, including a communique from the Presbyterian Church in the USA, which 
decried what it called the "devillagization" program.21 
The escalating human rights crisis in Romania also deeply concerned the Central 
Committee of the World Council of Churches, and very intense debates regarding the strategy 
to be followed took place at its meetings in Moscow in July of 1989. Attention was called 
to the human rights situation in Romania coupled with the hope that there would be a 
positive response to the international concerns expressed and that the situation would be 
normalized. The final decision by the Central Committee regarding Romania was to monitor 
and express concern about the reports regarding human rights violations and at the same time 
to maintain relationships with the churches and express sensitivity to their dilemma. 22 This 
decision was perceived by an outspoken minority as little more than a modest revision of the 
quiet diplomacy strategy and has returned to trouble the committee. 
On the eve of the revolution the religious situation in Romania was a very complex and 
volatile one involving both the registered and the unregistered religious communities. There 
were profound concerns for increased breathing space on the part of the churches, but there 
were no signs that the Communist State would begin to respect the civil and religious rights 
of its citizens. The religious communities were always carefully monitored by the Securitate 
because they were perceived as potentially destabilizing forces for the Socialist Society. They 
had remained the only social structures which had not been fully integrated into the 
Romanian political system due to their basic ideological incompatibility. The astounding and 
exciting changes that suddenly took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe inspired 
hope and expectation and brought about a new respect for human rights and religious 
freedom. Churches in the Communist countries now found thrust upon them possibilities for 
leadership, renewal, and social service that they had not experienced in many years. There 
were also new dangers: old problems could surface once again, and the process of 
6 
transformation itself was bound to invite its own conflicts. In the light of the bankruptcy 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology, there began a search for new values, new economic models, 
and new systems of political and social justice. 
Until the middle of December, 1989, Romania appeared to be immune to these 
monumental changes or so its President loudly proclaimed. Nicolae Ceausescu made it clear 
that as long as he was in charge, Romania would not follow the other Eastern European 
countries along the road toward democracy and radical social and political change. 23 
Ceausescu appeared to be in complete control of Romania.24 His large, well-armed security 
forces had an extensive informant system that penetrated every part of the society and 
seemed to be omnipresent if not invincible. A Romanian poet stated in March of 1989 that 
even "the judiciary and the press" had become "instruments of intimidation and terror against 
the population," thus the "silent revolt" in the streets. 25 In addition to an abysmal human 
rights record, Romania had an economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. The crisis 
provoked by the Ceausescu regime had been developing gradually, and particularly since 
1982, people seemed to be the last priority in what was called a "nightmare world."26 There 
were two groups, however, that continued to resist his total control--the minorities, 
particularly the Hungarians and the increasingly restive religious communities. It was the 
convergence of these two that provided the spark that toppled him in a spasm of violence 
that was literally televised around the world despite the elaborate and costly security 
measures that he had taken. 
The basic facts regarding the Romanian revolution are well-known. On December 1 6, 
1989, there was a confrontation between the local authorities, who were supported by the 
secret police and religious believers surrounding a Hungarian Reformed Church in Timisoara 
in the western part of Romania. Laszlo Tokes, the minister of this church, was an outspoken 
critic of the oppression of the Hungarian minority and of the Ceausescu plan to destroy 
thousands of villages. Tokes had been having serious difficulties with both the Church and 
the State authorities for several years.27 Tensions had been building up during 1 989, 
particularly since July 24 when a videotape was shown on Hungarian television of Tokes 
making his protests in his church. The videotape caused profound concern within the 
Hungarian nation and shocked the leadership of Romania. 
The Reformed Bishop, Laszlo Papp, sent Tokes a series of ultimatums ordering him to 
take a church in the remote village of Mineo in northern Transylvania. Tokes and his church 
strongly protested this decision and accused Papp of "violating the laws of the Church and 
the State."28 For his defiance Tokes was put under surveillance by the Securitate, harassed, 
and beaten. His supporters were terrorized, and one died under very mysterious 
circumstances. It was nothing less than a miracle that Tokes was able to survive this ordeal. 29 
The conviction that he was a spokesman for God in the midst of the "nightmare world" in 
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which he found himself became his underlying theme.30 He had a burning passion for 
authentic religious freedom, a deep awareness of a threatened cultural heritage, and an 
unshakable dimension of hope grounded in his religious tradition and inspired by the 
dramatic changes brought about by perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. TOkes declared that the revolution could not stop at the Romanian borders. His 
followers viewed him as a modern day prophet who had dared to tell the truth when 
everyone else was lying. He had the courage to challenge the corrupt, unjust system that 
tyrannized them. 31 
The Securitate's persecution of Tokes was to rally a small but dedicated parish to his 
defense and to evoke tremendous sympathy throughout the ecumenical religious community 
in Timisoara. This community seemed to come spontaneously to his assistance, and just as 
spontaneously freedom from tyranny became the common cause for the thousands who 
surrounded the Reformed Church,32 particularly after it was clear that the Securitate had 
abducted Tokes. Tokes was supported in a moment of euphoria by his own faithful 
parishioners and by an ecumenical community of believers (Adventists, Baptists, Catholics, 
Orthodox, and Pentecostalists), who in turn inspired the community at large to take their 
destiny into their own hands.33 In that moment they transcended their ethnic divisions and 
their religious rivalries and united on the basis of their common human dignity in their 
desperate thrust against overwhelming odds for the freedom that most of them had never 
known. The citizens of Timisoara came to the conclusion that it was better to die with 
dignity than to continue to live in slavery. They found themselves ready to choose death 
over Ceausescuism. Their decision electrified their entire country and called the attention 
of the world to their dilemma.34 The fall of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu and their alleged 
secret trial were followed by their execution on Christmas Day with the announcement, 
"Good news this Christmas Day: the Antichrist is dead."35 For reasons Ceausescu probably 
never fully understood, the apocalyptic mythology of the ancient books of Daniel and 
Revelation was very popular with the Romanian churches which had become profoundly 
disillusioned with his regime. What was perceived as the most powerful dictatorship in 
Europe collapsed in just a few days in the face of an aroused nation. 
The international ecumenical agencies such as the World Council of Churches, the 
Lutheran World Federation, and the Conference of European Churches, greatly assisted by 
the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Hungary, responded quickly and in an unprecedented 
manner to help meet the shocking emergency needs of the Romanian people. They used their 
ecumenical networks to channel food, medicine, and relief supplies to the destitute Romanian 
communities.36 The Neo-Protestants were assisted by this ecumenical effort as well as by 
their own evangelical agencies in the West. 
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The revolution brought about dramatic changes within the Romanian society at large and 
for the religious communities in particular. The revolution made it possible for the first time 
in more than forty years for the Churches to be really free, to begin to govern themselves, 
to set their own agendas, to revise their structures, and to live out their own lives and 
articulate their own mission in the fullest and most complete way. They had an unparalleled 
opportunity for their ministries and for their service, for which in large measure they were 
totally unprepared, although they had helped to pave the way for the revolution by keeping 
alive the spirit of democracy and the belief in the innate dignity of every human being. 
A more careful study needs to be made of the various roles that the Romanian churches 
and their leaders played in providing important centers of dissent, meaning, and values 
within the totalitarian state. Within the Romanian Orthodox Church there was widespread 
restiveness which culminated in an open and forceful challenge to the idolatry of Marxist 
atheism by Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa. 37 The discontent within the Baptist Church 
was expressed by Joseph Tson who charged that there was radical, intolerable interference 
in the life of the Church by the Department of Cults, warned that "if faced with a conflict 
of loyalties," Baptists would be obliged to put their loyalty to God first,"38 focussed on the 
destructive impact of atheism on morality, and announced that the "Christ Revolution" alone 
would meet the deepest needs of the Romanian society.39 The deep concerns of the Eastern­
rite Catholic Church were personified in the courageous and eloquent protests of the French 
lecturer from Cluj, Doina Cornea, who sent open letters to Ceausescu charging that the entire 
country had become "a gigantic prison" and its citizens lived in "constant fear." She asked "on 
the basis of what law" the members of the "Greek Catholic religious community" were 
prevented from "hearing Mass on Sundays." She faced Ceausescu with these poignant 
questions: "Do I not have the right to pray and receive spiritual comfort according to the 
religion in which I was born? . . . Does not the Constitution guarantee freedom of 
conscience?"40 All three of these dissidents suffered serious forms of harassment. Calciu was 
imprisoned under appalling conditions; Tson was forced into exile, and Cornea was beaten 
and placed under house arrest. Their protests, however, made a lasting impact on many 
thousands of religiously oriented as well as secularized Romanians who anxiously awaited the 
day of liberation. 
Tokes emphasizes that despite the compromises of the hierarchies, "the churches became 
guardians of evangelical, historical, traditional, and human values. Struggling with internal 
and external circumstances and drawing strength from their faith, the churches kept alive in 
the people the hope of liberation, becoming in this way the repository of a better and more 
just future."41 
The churches have already begun to take steps to use their new freedom to revitalize their 
communities and transform their nation in the light of their own particular perspectives. 
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Understandably some groups are using this freedom in a very cautious way given their . 
historical experience ::J_nd serious reservations that many have regarding the present State. 
There are those who maintain that the original revolution has been hijacked and that a 
second revolution is necessary.42 
The relationships between the churches and the· State have been changed in important 
ways although not wi�hout problems. The nemesis of the religious communities, the old 
Department of Cults, became the "Ministry of Cults" and finally the "State Secretariat for 
Religious affairs" and may in time be transformed into a more supportive structure after 
some initial blunders. · Important leadership changes have taken place at both the local and 
nation�l levels in many of the churches. Laszlo Tokes, for example, was elected a bi�hop of 
the Hungarian Reformed Church replacing an unrepentant Papp who had fled to France.43 
Patriarch Teoctist of the Romanian Orthodox Church resigned on January 1 8  only to be 
reinstated on April 5, I 990. The Holy Synod was convinced that this decision would 
strengthen the unity of the "ancestral" church and the pastoral and missionary activity so 
deeply needed at that time.44 
New forms of ecumenical ventures have emerged concurrent with old tensions which had 
never been resolved and new ones brought about by the Ceausescu tyranny. The Hungarian 
Protestant Churches have united with the Latin Rite Catholic Church and adopted a 
document which calls for a free church in a free society.45 These same Protestant Churches 
along with the German Lutheran Church have held meetings with the Romanian Orthodox 
Church under the stimulus of the WCC and the CEC of which they are members to assess 
their needs and conduct their mission more effectively among the people of Romania. They 
recognized the critical importance of developing trust and confidence within the country so 
that "freedom and democracy" could be fully achieved through "non-violent and 
reconciliatory means." They took steps to set up a national ecumenical platform which would 
facilitate dialogue among the churches, provide an ecumenical instrument whereby the 
churches could speak publicly, and established priority areas for ecumenical cooperation 
and witness. One of the priorities was "national-ethnic reconciliation" whereby the churches 
would have a special responsibility for creating positive models for a "multi-racial, multi­
cultural society." Other priorities included new religious legislation, religious education in 
the public schools, the reevangelization of the Romanian people, a joint ecumenical witness 
involving ecological concerns, and the transformation of life for those most underprivileged 
within the society. They also established a Bible Society, and they plan to issue ecumenical 
translations of the Bible in the languages of the churches. A committee from the Lutheran, 
Reformed, and Orthodox traditions was formed to implement the proposals. The hope was 
expressed that representatives of other churches such as the Baptists and the Pentecostalists 
would acceptan invitation to participate fully in the aid programs.46 
10  
The Neo-Protestant communities under the leadership of Joseph Tson have organized an 
Evangelical Alliance to protect their freedom and communicate their message to the nation 
by establishing publishing facilities, distributing Bibles, planning an extensive radio and 
television ministry, founding their own schools, and conducting major crusades and meetings 
throughout the country.47 They held their first national congress in Oct<;>ber, 1 990, with an 
attendance of 5,000 in Bucharest in the Palace Hall where Ceausescu used to exhort the party 
leaders and the nation. They expressed their concerns to President Iliescu regarding their 
perception of the "official bias" shown to the Orthodox Church, the importance of religious 
education, their right to equal access to the media, their support of the Bible in the taking 
of oaths, and the need for more restrictions on abortion.48 In many ways it is obvious that 
Neo-Protestantism has come of age. There is good reason to believe that the Billy Graham 
crusade in Romania in September, 1 985, may have been an important factor in the emergence 
of the Evangelical Alliance. His meetings attracted thousands of Neo-Protestants even 
though there appeared to be a deliberate plan to keep Graham's itinerary a secret. This was 
the first time in their history when they had the opportunity of officially coming together 
in such large numbers. This unquestionably raised their morale, made them much more 
visible, and enabled them to develop a deeper sense of solidarity with one another and with 
like minded believers in the traditional churches.49 
There are many common concerns which ought to encourage cooperation among all the 
religious communities in Romania. There is a complex of factors, however, which have kept 
them apart in the past: sociological, political, cultural, theological, and psychological, 
including distrust and antagonisms which have deep historical roots. The old tensions 
between the right and the left wings of the Protestant Reformation are still significant issues. 
There are serious problems which have surfaced between the Neo-Protestant Churches and 
the Romanian Orthodox Church regarding the issue of proselytism and the Neo-Protestant 
version of the Bible in which idols are translated as icons, 50 reminiscent of their struggles in 
the interwar period. Also the Neo-Protestant success may be perceived as a serious threat 
to the self identification of the Orthodox as the Church of the Romanian People. The Neo­
Protestants in particular are almost paranoid regarding the possibility of Orthodoxy once 
again becoming the privileged church and frequently make very critical and caustic 
comments regarding its spiritual condition. There is a deep feeling within the minority 
churches, articulated most clearly by Laszlo Tokes, that the hierarchy of the Orthodox 
Church has been all too willingly a "tool in the hands of the dictator."51 Also the property 
issue between the Orthodox and the Uniate Church which was given full legal recognition 
in April, 1 990, apparently remains unresolved.52 Two of the best statements from the 
Orthodox perspective defending the role of its church under the Communist regime are by 
Professor Dumitru Staniloae and Dr. Anca Monolache.53 
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In the spring of 1 990 the religious communities were invited by the "state secretariat for 
religion" to appoint representatives to work on a new law to grant the churches self­
determination and freedom of religion replacing the 1 948 Law of Cults, which had given the 
State the right of intervening in and controlling their internal affairs. The discussion among 
the representatives of the religious communities proved to be very difficult even though on 
many issues those present shared similar positions. The major controversy was between the 
Romanian Orthodox and the Neo-Protestant churches. The Orthodox argued vigorously for 
a more restrictive law, whereas the Neo-Protestants, joined by other churches, supported a 
version reflecting more religious freedom. At one point the Evangelical Alliance withdrew 
from the committee in protest against what it regarded as regulations that were too 
restrictive. Apparently there were at least three proposed regulations which troubled the 
Neo-Protestants: (I) the "organization and function of religious communities must be carried 
out in agreement with the constitution of all other religious communities" (which could be 
implemented so as to limit their evangelistic activity), (2) church activity should not 
"contradict public order, state security or public morals" (which reminded them of 
comparable legislation in the past that had been used to deny them their freedom), and (3) 
the Secretary of State for Religious Affairs would "authorize the churches to buy and sell 
land and buildings" (which was a very sensitive point because the Department of Cults under 
the Ceausescu regime had made it very difficult, if not impossible, for many Neo-Protestant 
communities to acquire their own houses of worship). Gheorghe Vladutescu, the new 
Secretary of State for Religious Affairs, has reported that the most important point on which 
all the churches agree is that all the religious communities are equal before the law and that 
the Romanian Orthodox Church would not legally be declared as the State Church. Tensions 
have emerged, however, between the secretariat for religious affairs and the churches, the 
secretariat preferring a much more restrictive law than the one which the churches approved. 
A compromise statement was finally reached; the representatives of the churches decided to 
present it to the Romanian parliament with an accompanying letter stating that they were 
willing to support the proposed legislation but that they would object to "a more restrictive 
final version." It has been reported that the secretariat for religious affairs submitted the 
draft to the parliament but without the letter from the churches.54 Apparently substantive 
progress has been made by the religious communities in the legislation which they 
recommended; it is clearly evident, however, that the level of religious freedom experienced 
in the western democracies will be a goal toward which they will need to continue to strive. 
Unquestionably there is a serious moral void within the Romanian society at large. This 
is the tragic legacy of the Ceausescu era which needs to be addressed. More than forty years 
of oppression, corruption, paranoia, and social atomization have taken their tragic toll. In 
an interview Aurel Dragos Munteanu, the Romanian ambassador to the UN, called attention 
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to the "inherent destruction and mistrust" that pervaded the nation. He recognized that the 
fundamental problem was not political but moral. 55 The religious communities as a whole 
are keenly aware of this problem, and they are anxious to make their respective 
contributions. The Neo-Protestant Churches in particular are deeply sensitive to what they 
perceive to be an historic opportunity to lay the moral foundations of a new society; this 
helps to explain their tremendous missionary zeal.56 The churches have emerged from the 
nightmare of the Ceausescu era with a high level of credibility, and they have a special 
responsibility to provide positive models for a society which is still struggling to find its way 
towards reconciliation, justice, and truth at many different levels. There is a crying need for 
dynamic religious as well as political leaders with unimpeachable credentials and with a 
vision of what the nation ought to become. 
Members of an interfaith delegation from the United States visited Yugoslavia, Romania, 
and Hungary in the fall of 1 990. Rabbi Arthur Schneier, president of the Appeal of 
Conscience Foundation, reported that in all three countries the delegation found "strained 
relations, inter-ethnic friction and interreligious strife." He felt that there was "an alarming 
absence of any feeling for religious or ethnic pluralism, and this bodes ill for the new 
societies there." Father Leonid Kishkovsky, president of the National Council of Churches, 
reported that this delegation met with religious leaders in Romania and stressed that they 
should call for "religious tolerance and respect." The leaders agreed that these issues were 
important but felt that in order to accomplish these goals they "must educate their 
parishioners to the values of a pluralistic society, and this requires a long educational process 
for which there is little if any precedent in Romanian society."57 The people, however, may 
be far more prepared than commonly realized, but it may well be that the leadership is more 
than a small part of the problem. 
The key in many ways to the problems confronting the religious communities is still the 
Romanian Orthodox Church, so inextricably related to the national culture and the church 
with which most Romanians identify themselves. There is the hope that Orthodox leaders 
will emerge, tap the tremendous power of this church, and transform it into a creative 
reconciling agent. The appointment of Bishop Daniel Ciobotea as the new Metropolitan of 
Moldavia is an important step in this direction. 58 President Ion Iliescu has reportedly called 
upon the Romanian Orthodox Church to "contribute to the moral and spiritual rebirth of a 
new Romania in harmony with its mission and vocation."59 This ought to involve a profound 
sensitivity to its internal ecumenical, social, and prophetic responsibilities in addition to its 
spiritual mission and would go a long way toward challenging and inspiring the other 
religious communities to do their part. There is, however, a long history of theoretical rather 
than practical ecumenism in Romania. The churches have yet to demonstrate fully that they 
have transcended the ethnic and religious tensions that have plagued them in the past. They 
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now could play an important role toward the goal of peace, justice, and harmony within the 
society at large if they would vigorously promote an authentic pluralism, whereby the 
integrity of the various cultures and faiths is preserved, respected, and recognized as 
enriching rather than impoverishing. 
Tokes is the prophet in these areas as well. He has stated, "The church in Romania must 
'convert and . . .  be cleansed' so as to be the instrument of God to transform society, promote 
universal reconciliation, and create a 'new dignified and just world order.'" Tokes, however, 
is also very much of a realist. "In all likelihood," he added, "this task will be at least as 
difficult as it was to stand in opposition to the dictatorship."60 In the light of this statement 
it is interesting to note that Bishop Tokes is involved in a serious conflict with the present 
Romanian State. He has charged the government with continuing the "dictatorial methods" 
of the old regime and has claimed that the "spirit of Ceausescu lives on."61 The "hero of the 
Revolution" now finds that the Romanian parliament has launched "criminal investigations" 
into his activities for "insulting" the Romanian State by allegedly encouraging anti­
government demonstrations.62 Tokes may have realized how painful and costly the process 
of societal transformation would be, but he may not have anticipated how difficult the 
burden of trying to be a prophet would be in the "new era." 
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